The greater implications of the Ankara-PKK negotiations

A delegation of the pro-Kurdish DEM party announcing the letter of Öcalan

As the PKK-Turkish peace talks enter their final stages, significant milestones have been reached, including the PKK’s declaration of a ceasefire at the request of its founder, Abdullah Öcalan.

However, a key question remains: what are the interests do the PKK and what do the other Kurdish authorities in the region have to gain?

In this article, we will provide a comprehensive analysis of the context behind the conflict, the major stakeholders involved in the negotiations, their roles, and their strategic interests.

The PKK

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), officially recognized as a militant-terror organization, has been engaged in an armed conflict with the Turkish Armed Forces since 1984, with goals of achieving greater Kurdish autonomy within Turkiye and abroad. The PKK has been designated as a terror organisation by Turkiye, the European Union, the United States, and other international actors due to its use of violent tactics. Their protracted conflict has led to over 37,000 casualties and the displacement of more than 3 million ,predominantly Kurdish, civilians impacting both local populations and regional stability.

Despite intermittent ceasefires in 1999 and 2013, efforts toward lasting peace have gained renewed momentum due to vocal support from all major parties within Turkiye to reach a resolution, as well as foreign nations and international organizations, including the United Nations, the European Commission, and the United States who have played as key supports and mediators of the negotiations. A notable development in this context is the permission granted to Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned founder of the PKK, to send an official letter to the group, urging them to lay down their arms and pursue a political solution to achieve Kurdish rights. This initiative adds a new dimension to the peace process, displaying a co-operative gesture from the Turkish authorities to reach a more sustainable resolution to the conflict.

The PKK's increasing isolation, stemming from its lack of foreign support and degrading sentiment among Kurds, has put them in an eager position to gain legitimacy as a political organisation rather then remaining as one of the countless sectarian militia groups plaguing the middle-east.

One of the PKK’s most clear demand in these negotiations is the release of its founder and former leader, Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned on İmralı Island since his capture and arrest in 1999. While Öcalan is almost certain to be barred from holding any government position and would likely face exile from Turkey, he remains a symbolic figure for many Kurds who view him as a defender of their identity and culture. His release would be perceived as a significant gesture of reconciliation and a symbol of progress for the Kurdish struggle in Turkiye.

However, the prospect of Öcalan’s release remains a contentious issue. He is an extremely polarizing figure within Turkish society, and any move by the ruling AK Party to secure his release would likely face strong opposition from rival political factions seeking to leverage the issue for their own political gain. In addition to this, the fear that Öcalan’s release may unintentionally inspire mass protests in the Kurdish dominated south-east looms over Ankara's head.

Another key demand from the PKK is political immunity for its senior leaders, commanders and personnel, along with a potential pathway for their integration into governmental frameworks in Turkiye or Syria. While an agreement to halt the prosecution or targeted elimination of top PKK figures is highly probable—and may already be in practice—the prospect of their formal integration into governance structures remains unlikely.

In Turkiye, the Kurdish DEM Party has spent a decade distancing itself from PKK affiliations, particularly following the widespread removal of DEM mayors over alleged links to the group. As a result, any attempt to incorporate former PKK leaders into the Turkish political system would face significant resistance from both Turkish law makers and likely the DEM party themselves.

In Syria, the PKK retains a substantial number of fighters within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), stemming from the coalition’s involvement in the fight against ISIS. Unlike in Turkiye, this force operates beyond Ankara’s direct influence, creating a potential avenue for integration into local governance structures. However, as the SDF continues its negotiations over integration within a broader Syrian framework, the inclusion of a large number of foreign combatants and PKK-affiliated leaders could complicate and undermine existing diplomatic progress.

While the PKK leadership is unlikely to be able to take any direct positions or roles within Turkish politics, they will likely be exiled to Europe, along with Öcalan where they may still place a critical lobbying role in European nations, where a lot of their key supports resign.

As for the fate of their combatants, Ankara will be unlikely to peruse arrests or attacks on members who are no longer active, especially those within Syria or Kurdistan region which is out of the direct grasp of the Turkish authorities.

The DEM Party

Officially the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party, DEM is a liberal-Kurdish party with a large focus on preserving and protecting Kurdish culture, language and rights within Turkiye.

DEM has long held significant influence in the Kurdish-majority southeast of Turkey. However, in recent years, the party has faced increased scrutiny, with authorities in Ankara launching crackdowns and investigations based on alleged link with the PKK and separatist movements. These actions have resulted in the removal of DEM's mayors from key strongholds, such as Van, with replacements appointed by trustees from the ruling AK Party.

Despite these challenges, DEM has played a critical role as a mediator in negotiations, facilitating dialogue between Abdullah Öcalan and Ankara by sending delegations to İmralı Island. This role is one that no other Turkish political party has been willing or able to take on, given the potential backlash from nationalist and conservative segments of the Turkish population. As a result, DEM has positioned itself as a unifying force between Turks and Kurds in the public eye, which has strengthened its negotiating leverage in political discussions.

Given this position, DEM's engagement with Ankara is not without its strategic interests. By acting as an intermediary, the party has sought to gain political concessions, including greater autonomy and recognition of Kurdish rights, while also securing a more prominent role in Turkish politics. Ultimately, DEM hopes to achieve a balance between advancing the interests of the Kurdish population and ensuring its own influence within the broader Turkish political framework.

While the party's involvement in negotiations has undoubtedly improved its public perception, it has also inadvertently highlighted the alleged ties between DEM and the PKK leadership. These speculations could potentially serve as a basis for further investigations and crackdowns on DEM mayors and offices, ultimately undermining the party's objectives and achieving the opposite of its intended outcomes.

Ultimately, the fate of DEM for the rest of this decade relies on the success of these negotiations as after the 2013 ceasefire collapsed, DEMs predecessor's, the HDP, faced multiple trials and prosecution's, leading to the arrest of their former leader Selahattin Demirtas.

The Kurdistan Region

The Kurdistan Autonomous Region, formally recognized in 2005, has operated as a Kurdish-governed region separate from federal Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War.

Rather than viewing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as a singular entity, it is important to differentiate between the two dominant political parties in the region, as they control distinct territories and have divergent interests concerning the PKK-Turkey negotiations.

The larger of the two parties is the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which controls a significant portion of the region along the border with Turkey, including the capital city of the Kurdistan Region, Erbil. The KDP maintains notably strong relations with Ankara, with frequent meetings and delegations exchanged between the governments, primarily concerning security matters across their border. The KDP has also been in an on-and-off conflict with the PKK since 1983, which use the mountainous northern part of the region as a sanctuary and training ground.

The KDP’s cooperation with Turkey to drain the region of PKK militants has led to the construction of over 40 Turkish military bases in the region, alongside the stationing of more than 10,000 military personnel. As a result, the border area has experienced frequent raids, skirmishes, and bombardments, displacing thousands of Kurdish residents and exacerbating social instability. This has caused long-term damage to both the infrastructure and environment of the mountainous area with mass deforestation placing the natural habitation of rare species and plants at risk of extinction.

For this reason, the KDP has been a staunch advocator of the negotiations, as the party hopes that successful dialogue will result in the withdrawal of both PKK and Turkish forces from the region, allowing for the resettlement of displaced communities and environmental conservation.

Although a full Turkish withdrawal from the region seems unlikely, even if negotiations yield a lasting ceasefire, Ankara may be inclined to strike an agreement with the KDP to maintain a limited presence of joint security forces at select outposts.

The diminished presence of PKK militants in Kurdish-controlled territory would also allow the KDP to refocus its attention and resources on addressing its longstanding territorial dispute with the federal government of Iraq over the oil-rich district of Kirkuk, which had been a critical economic hub for the region before its capture by the Iraqi military in 2017; Thus giving the KDP an economic incentive to help forge a lasting ceasefire.

The other dominant political party in the Kurdistan Region is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls a smaller area along the border with Iran and has been in a bitter rivalry with the KDP over power-sharing disputes and oil revenue.

Historically, the PUK and PKK were allied in many regional conflicts up until 1991, when the PUK severed all official ties with the PKK. However, the PUK has been accused of facilitating and training PKK offshoots in Syria and using Sulaymaniyah Airport as a connection route between PKK fighters in Kurdistan and Syria. As a result, Turkish authorities imposed an embargo barring all Turkish airliners from entering Sulaymaniyah International Airport, a key revenue source for the PUK’s largest city. In addition, some former Turkish military officials have even called for the assassination of the PUK's leader, Bafel Talabani.

It is evident that the PUK's relationship with Turkey remains strained due to its associations with the PKK, which has had significant adverse effects on its economy and its ability to compete with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

Despite these allegations, the PUK continues to advocate for a peaceful resolution to the negotiations, hoping that a successful ceasefire will result in the lifting of sanctions on Sulaymaniyah Airport and ease the hostility between Ankara and the PUK.

While Turkey may consider lifting sanctions on the airport for its own economic interests, Ankara's strong alliance with the KDP is likely to persist. As such, antagonism and attempts to undermine regional competitors like the PUK is expected to continue, maintaining the status quo.

The SDF

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a Kurdish-led coalition in Syria composed of a diverse variety of armed groups and militias. The SDF emerged during the fight against ISIS as a branch of the PKK, successfully capturing key cities for ISIS and establishing a de facto autonomous zone in north and east Syria. This development was heavily supported by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France who helped rebrand the PKK offshoot into a broader coalition to include many ethnic and religious militias. Many alleged PKK offshoots, including those in leadership positions, make up the ranks of the SDF, which has led to significant Turkish bombardment and incursions by Turkish proxy militias in Syria.

Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the SDF and the transitional Syrian government have engaged in intense negotiations concerning the SDF's autonomy and integration into the new government.

As noted earlier, the presence of PKK-linked groups within the SDF has complicated these negotiations, placing immense strain on the SDF's civilian infrastructure due to frequent shelling and drone attacks from Turkish forces across the border.

The advantages for the SDF in severing ties with the PKK are clear: it would eliminate Turkey's justification of "combating terrorism" as a basis for ongoing military strikes and incursions into SDF-controlled areas. Additionally, it would place the SDF in a stronger bargaining position with the Damascus government, which is still heavily influenced by Ankara. Disassociating from the PKK could also improve internal stability within the SDF-controlled regions, particularly among the Arab populations who have expressed opposition to the PKK's presence within the coalition.

However, the situation still remains uncertain for the SDF. Even if they fully dissociate from the PKK, they may still face a large-scale invasion from Turkish proxies, under the pretext of creating a unified Syria. Moreover, the SDF would lose a significant portion of its most skilled and experienced fighters. Ultimately, the outcome of these negotiations will play a pivotal role in determining the future of both the SDF and Syria in the coming years.