Libya, the kremlins next client.

Following the collapse of Assad's rule in Syria, Russia is now turning its attention to Libya as a permanent naval location.

During the 60-year reign of the Baathist regime in Syria, Russia served as one of its most significant military and economic supporters. Moscow provided continuous air defence to protect the Assad regime from rebel militias during the Syrian Civil War, and at the height of the conflict, stationed over 63,000 ground troops. This substantial support played a crucial role in preserving Assad's rule throughout the war. However, this assistance was not driven by altruism or friendship, but by Russia's own geopolitical interests in the Mediterranean region.

Russia’s only major deep-sea ports on the European side of the country are completely cut off from access to the Mediterranean, which is a vital region for its strategic and military interests. Consequently, Russia relied heavily on Syria’s Tartus port as a de facto exclave for its navy, allowing it to station nuclear submarines and warships in the Mediterranean to maintain a constant deterrent and threat against Europe.

However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has strained Russia’s resources, leading to a significant reduction in its military presence in Syria by 2024. This withdrawal provided Syrian rebel groups, notably Tahrir al-Sham, with the opportunity to launch a swift assaults on major cities such as Aleppo, Homs, and, ultimately, Damascus. In December 2024, the Assad regime fled to Russia, leaving almost all of western Syria to fell under the control of the rebels, with the memories of Russian chemical attacks on civilians still fresh in their minds.

This shift placed Russia's naval base at Tartus in immediate jeopardy of being retaken, especially given the reluctance of the transitional government in Syria to negotiate with Russia.

As a result, Putin now faces a critical dilemma: he must either find an alternative location in the Mediterranean to establish a new naval base or risk losing a key strategic asset that serves as a vital deterrent against NATO’s escalation in support of Ukraine.

Since the fall of Gaddafi's rule in 2011, Libya, like Syria, has been embroiled in sectarian violence, with militia groups carving the country into competing factions in a bloody civil war. Various foreign powers have seized the opportunity to support and fund different sides of the conflict for their own regional interest.

The Tripoli-based Government of National accord (GNA) has received backing from the United States, UK, UN, much of the European Union, and Turkiye. On the opposing side is the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar, which has maintained strong ties with the Kremlin since 2015. The Russian government has provided military support, including the deployment of Russian military contractors such as the Wagner Group, to train and support Haftar's forces.

Libya serves as a crucial supply corridor between mainland Russia and its private military contractors operating in resource-rich African nations. As such, it holds significant strategic importance for Russia, particularly in recent years, given the logistical challenges and supply shortages faced in the ongoing war in Ukraine. This connection enables Russia to sustain its operations in Africa while maintaining its military influence in the region.

Recently, Russia has significantly increased its presence in LNA-controlled territories, deploying convoys of ground units and modernizing air bases. While Russia's military footprint in Libya continues to grow, the prospect of establishing a permanent naval base in the region remains uncertain.

Although Haftar's position is often compared to that of Bashar al-Assad, it is important to note that the LNA has little international recognition as the official government of Libya. The LNA does not control the capital, Tripoli, nor does it have legitimacy from the United Nations. This lack of recognition would make any agreement for a Russian naval base in LNA-controlled territory highly problematic, as it would lack official legitimacy.

In such a scenario, Russian personnel and assets deployed in Libya would be vulnerable, subject to the whims of a warlord's tactical alliance with Moscow rather than a formal agreement with a recognized government.

The LNA is widely considered the weaker and more unstable side in the conflict and the looming threat of a large-scale offensive from the GNA has been on high-alert since the fall of Assad. Any Russian naval that fell under the GNA's control would face an even worse fate then the Tartus port as any treaty with the LNA would hold no grounds of legitimacy, putting Russian technology and naval ships at risk from falling into western hands.

In addition to this, the Kremlin forming a naval outpost in Libya may risk provoking the Trump administration and deuterating hopes in keeping the annexed Ukrainian territories under the current negotiations.

For this these reasons, Putin may not see Libya as a risk worth committing its naval fleet to. The Kremlin is likely to continue relying on Libya as a critical supply corridor for the foreseeable future, provided the LNA maintains control over its territory. However, Russia’s naval presence in the Mediterranean is likely to diminish as the country adopts a more defensive posture along its own borders, especially with the increasing threat of NATO intervention in Ukraine.